The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland

Author(s): Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth
Document Type: Book
Year: 2000
Publisher: Pluto Press
Place of Publication: London
ISBN: 0745313930
Subject Area(s): NI Conflict, Community Relations, Crime/Criminal Justice, Policing, Equality Issues

Abbreviations: RUC - Royal Ulster Constabulary, NI - Northern Ireland, IRA - Irish Republican Army

Background to the Research

  • The RUC has been the main agent of state control since the establishment of NI in 1922. The book provides a detailed analysis of policing since the establishment of the state to the present day.

Research Approach

  • The authors drew on official statistics and on a series of interviews carried out with serving and retired police officers, members of loyalist and republican organisations and members of the public.

Main Findings

Policing under Stormont

  • Whilst the RUC did carry out routine duties, its primary role under the Stormont regime was not 'community policing' but the policing of political dissent. Good police-community relations, particularly with the nationalist/Catholic community could only exist in so far as they did not conflict with the RUC's principal role in stifling nationalist and republican dissent.
  • The rise of the Civil Rights Movement into a mass movement in the 1960s and the manner by which the RUC repressed civil expressions of discontent fractured any pretence of policing by consent. It can be argued that the RUC in its handling of this situation prepared the way for the re-emergence of militant nationalism.
  • The Hunt Report of 1969 recommended that the RUC be reformed in terms of a liberal-democratic model of policing, the USC was to be disbanded, a Police Authority was to be established and there was to be open inspection of the RUC by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. The Report was greeted with reluctance by the Stormont government and hostility by sections of the Protestant community.
  • In interviews, several retired police officers felt that the Hunt Report was trying to impose an 'Anglicised' solution in the unique circumstances of NI. Others viewed it as an attempt to pacify nationalists. Other respondents stated that while they perceived little active opposition to the Hunt reforms, it lowered morale and created disillusionment.

Criminalisation and Normalisation: The Counter-Insurgency Solution

  • The arrival of the British Army in the 1970s saw the use of the military in a police role and removal of the RUC from the front line in NI. The military strategy implemented after 1969 explicitly recognised the political nature of the conflict, both in tactics (internment and intelligence screening) and in the treatment of prisoners (special category status).
  • The introduction of the Emergency Powers Act in 1973 heralded a new security strategy in which the IRA and its activities were criminalised and this brought about a fundamental reorganisation of the role of the security forces.
  • This reorganisation had several key strands; a reorganisation and rearming of the RUC to allow the introduction of police primacy; the setting up of interrogation centres for suspects on the basis of a centralised intelligence-gathering system; the introduction of 'special' legalisation to deal with political violence through the 'normal' legal system and the 'professionalisation' of RUC practice and discourse.
  • The result of the restructuring was a return for the RUC to its original role as a counter-insurgency force with enhanced capabilities and technology and the full support of the British government.

Legitimacy, Counter-Insurgency and Policing: The Legacy of the 1970s

  • The counter-insurgency measures put in place between 1974 and 1976 had begun to have a severe effect on the operational capabilities of the Provisionals. During 1976, over 2,000 suspects (mostly IRA related incidents) were convicted through the non-jury Diplock courts.
  • Allegations about the mistreatment of suspects under interrogation by the RUC Special Branch gathered momentum during 1977. Another tenet of the RUC's strategy to defeat the IRA was to use emergency legalisation used to arrest suspects as the primary means of policing republican areas. During this time these tactics brought the security forces under increased scrutiny from human rights groups, solicitors and various official enquiries. At the same time the RUC policed many areas, not affected by the conflict, normally.
  • The Hunger strikes of the early 1980s and the massive unrest in nationalist areas tested the doctrine of police primacy. For the first time since 1969, the RUC were in the front line in confronting unrest with the British Army as backup. Although civil unrest was largely contained, the long-term damage of criminialisation of prisoners led to new links being forged between the Catholic community and the IRA and the election of Sinn Fein members on both sides of the border.

The Supergrass Years

  • During the 1980s, the terrorist conviction rate on the basis of confessions began to decline and the RUC began to view the use of supergrasses as a viable alternative. Evidence suggests that the decision to use this method came from a high-level within the RUC. The use of supergrasses brought the legal system into further disrepute and the integrity of the judiciary was questioned.
  • By the beginning of the 1980s the RUC had specially-trained surveillance and operational units in place. The number of undercover operations carried out by the RUC increased during the 1980s. The RUC were involved in a number of undercover operations in which suspected members of the IRA were killed by members of the RUC.
  • Between January 1988 and December 1992, 27 people were killed by the security forces, 16 in undercover operations. These incidents led to accusations of a shoot to kill policy. The corrosive effect of the tacit support of government for such activities on democratic institutions has been incalculable.

Collusion and Death Squads

  • Since the beginning of the current conflict there have been allegations of collusion between the security forces and loyalists paramilitaries. From 1987 to 1994 loyalist gangs killed 229 people. Although various factors can account for the rise in loyalist activity, information was being leaked from the security forces to loyalist death squad.
  • The operational autonomy enjoyed by the RUC and British Army in Ireland is a key element in their ability to engage in illegal activities in the goal of defeating the IRA. The ability of the security force to run through a repertoire of counter-insurgency tactics was aided by the unswerving support of the judiciary.

Symbolism, Surveys and Police legitimacy

  • The Patton Commission Report in 1999 heralded changes within the RUC; symbolic and structural changes were instigated in order to gain the confidence of all sections of the NI community, encourage Catholic recruitment in the RUC and to normalise the role of the police in a post-conflict society.
  • The occupational culture of the RUC reflects the dominant political ideology and as such retains a unionist ethos. The crisis of confidence between the nationalist community and the RUC is fundamental one.
  • The Patten solution to policing is based on accountability and consent, not authoritarianism and control, and is in keeping with the wider need for modern societies to address the problem of governance of diversity.

 

Home | About ORB | Contact


Disclaimer: © ORB 2001Friday, 22-Oct-2004 15:18