Community Relations in Northern Ireland: The Long View

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During the 1990s efforts by the British Government in Northern Ireland focused on tackling systemic problems of disadvantage, discrimination and inequality. The development of Fair Employment Legislation and initiatives such as Targeting Social Need (TSN) and Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment Guidelines (PAFT) for government departments, whilst not without their critics (Osborne, 1996) signalled an acknowledgement on the part of government that something should be done to address these socio-economic disadvantages most acutely felt by the Catholic community. Juxtaposed with this, community relations became a policy priority at the beginning of the 1990s. Concerned primarily with promoting greater cross-community contact, the approach adopted at the time was criticised by those who believed that government was promoting an assimilist/integrationalist agenda that offered little more than a 'sticking plaster' solution to the conflict (Cairns and Hewstone, 2001; Hughes, forthcoming).

In the wake of political developments in the late 1990s, there are some signs that the community relations agenda has shifted from being 'symptom driven' to addressing root causes of conflict. Current practice is less concerned with promoting cross-community contact per se than with promoting cultural, religious and political pluralism, and the equality agenda has begun to define the nature of some community relations activity (Hughes, 2002). Measured by outcomes such as greater understanding of cultural diversity, increased willingness to engage in

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shared working, and, in some cases, an ability to influence wider political processes (Deloitte and Touche, 2001a; 2001b), a growing body of evidence suggests that community relations initiatives are having some positive impact at grass roots level (Knox, Hughes, Birrell, and McCready, 1994; Capita, 1997; Deloitte and Touche, 2001a; 2001b). Despite this, and against the support for local level power sharing and the principles of equality and equity (as evidenced by the 71 per cent who voted in favour of the Agreement at referendum) some research indicates that Northern Ireland has become a more divided society.

In housing, for example, longitudinal research has shown progressively higher levels of residential segregation with a majority of people choosing to live in polarised districts (Poole and Doherty, 1996; Doherty and Poole, 1997). Compounding the problem over the last few years, segregation has been accompanied by an increase in 'chill factors', referring to demarcation of sectarian boundaries with graffiti, flags, kerb painting and other manifestations of cultural/political identity and paramilitary association (Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE), 1999). An increase in polarisation is also evident in voting behaviour where, in the period immediately following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, voting preference reflected increasing support for the political extremes, with religion continuing to be the key determining factor (Carmichael and Knox, 1999). More recently, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin made substantial gains in the 2001 parliamentary and local council elections. The swing in the unionist vote from the pro-Agreement Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Alliance Party towards the anti-Agreement DUP party has been interpreted as reflecting a growing Protestant disillusionment with political reforms.

In addition to these developments, and undoubtedly linked to them, the on-going parades dispute between the Orange Order and residents of Catholic/nationalist areas has continued to
sour community relations. The latter have demanded re-routing of traditional Orange Order marches through nationalist districts, regarding them as triumphalist and inciting. An increase in Orange parades, however, and the refusal of the Orange Order to take alternative routes has resulted in some of the worst periods of civil unrest and disruption seen in over 30 years of conflict (Hughes, 1998).

It could be argued that increased polarisation is a logical outcome of a pluralist agenda which promotes and embraces diversity and difference. This does not, however, explain ongoing inter-community tension, hostility and intimidation. A range of explanations is offered in support of this apparent paradox. Wilson (2000), for example, argues that the Good Friday Agreement, although affirming the ‘consent principle’ – that is, that there can be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, except by the consent of the majority – has left in place ‘the polarised political battlefield’ because the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom (UK) remains unchanged. On the one hand, unionists continue to defend their Britishness, upheld by the Agreement. On the other, nationalists contend that under the terms of the Agreement their ‘Irishness’ must be given due expression. Sectarian tension, manifest in the ‘profusion of flags on the street’ is attributed to the conflict of interests inherent in these positions.

Focusing less on the Agreement per se, some academics have argued that increasing polarisation and sectarian tension, particularly with regards to the parades issue can be attributed to a growing sense of alienation within the Protestant community (Knox, 1995; Hughes, 1998; O’Neill, 2000). O’Neill argues that unionists feel particularly insecure about their position within the UK because they perceive that nationalists will ultimately accept nothing less than ‘political and cultural domination throughout Ireland’. This insecurity is intensified by British Government
engagement with the Irish Government since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (O’Neill, 2000, pp. 27--28). Concessions made to republicans during the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement have also exacerbated the problem. In particular, the British Government’s continued willingness to accommodate the demands of republicans, against the repeated failure of republican paramilitaries to deliver decommissioning within stipulated timeframes, has caused ructions at both political and grass roots levels within the Protestant community that threaten to destabilise the peace process (Aughey, 2001).

**RELATIONS BETWEEN PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS**

Set against this background it is revealing to examine the ebb and flow of community relations in Northern Ireland from 1989 to 2001 using data from social attitude surveys carried out over that period. The following results are based on data derived from the Community Relations modules included in the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes (NISA) surveys carried out between 1989 and 1996 and the 1999, 2000 and 2001 Life and Times surveys.

One standard survey question asked of all respondents is whether they think relations between Protestants and Catholics are better, worse or the same as they were five years ago (Figure 1). In the period 1989 to 1999 there was a general trend towards more optimism with a particular peak in 1995 following the ceasefires of the previous year. Overall there was an increase of 28 percentage points over the period in the proportion of people who believed that relations between Protestants and Catholics had improved. This level of optimism remained steady in 1999 but between 1999 and 2001 began to fall again and had dropped a massive 22 percentage points by 2001.
Of particular significance however is the growing disparity in attitudes between Protestants and Catholics. Over the years between 1989 and 1994 Catholic and Protestant views about the state of community relations was virtually identical. 1995 and the post-cease fire period saw a greater surge of optimism among Catholics than Protestants though both had come together quite closely by 1996. However Catholic optimism surged again following the Good Friday Agreement and only began to fall during 2000 and 2001. Protestants appeared to reserve judgment immediately following the Belfast Agreement but optimism began to drop off as early as 1999 and has continued to fall since then. Most notable is the fact that since 1996 considerably fewer Protestants than Catholics believe that relations are better.
When asked whether relations between Protestants and Catholics would be better, worse or the same in five years time (figure 3) the pattern is similar. Protestants are consistently more pessimistic than Catholics about the future, nonetheless the results indicate a peak in optimism in 1995 and 1998 followed by a fairly swift drop in confidence among both communities post 1998.
Figure 3: % believing that relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in 5 years time (by religion)

The growing disparity between the Protestant and Catholic responses is perhaps an endorsement of a Catholic community growing in confidence and a Protestant community feeling increasingly marginalised by wider political developments. It has been argued that in the most recent elections the key deciding factors for those who changed their vote from UUP to DUP were the failure of the Good Friday Agreement to deliver decommissioning and the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (Belfast Telegraph, 2001a). Attempts to generate a political culture based on equality and fair treatment have been interpreted by the Protestant community as undermining their interests (Belfast Telegraph, 2001b). This is likely to influence attitudes to, and relations with, the Catholic community.
CONTINUING SEGREGATION IN HOUSING, EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION?

Although questions about relations between Protestants and Catholics may be relatively superficial because they are impressionistic, a series of questions that aim to gauge behaviour have also been included over the years. These refer to residential, workplace and educational segregation and the willingness of respondents to engage with the other community.

Across the years, the proportion of people wishing to live in mixed religion neighbourhoods has always been in the majority and, for Catholic respondents, considerably in the majority. Nonetheless certain patterns reflecting waning community relations are repeated in the results for this question. Between 1989 and 1996 the proportion of Protestants wishing to live in mixed neighbourhoods rose fourteen percentage points from 67% in 1989 to an all time high of 81% in 1996. But support fell between 1996 and 2001 as confidence whittled away and by 2001 only 59% of Protestants expressed a wish to live in mixed neighbourhoods. For Catholics the pattern was similar (albeit that levels of support are consistently higher than those for Protestants). While in 1989 75% of Catholics expressed a desire to live in mixed neighbourhoods, this rose to all all time high of 85% in 1996 and then dropped back to 72% in 2001. By 2001 the desire among both communities to live in mixed religion neighbourhoods had reached an all time low, particularly marked within the Protestant community.
When asked ‘if you were working and had to change your job, would you prefer a workplace with people of only your own religion, or a mixed-religion workplace?’, the pattern of responses across the period is almost identical to that above. Support for mixed-religion workplaces (always high) rose still further between 1989 and 1996 and then rapidly fell off, dropping by a staggering 25 percentage points among the Protestant community and 15 percentage points among the Catholic community.
While it is clear that a large majority of the population does prefer mixed religion neighbourhoods and mixed religion workplaces (two-thirds and three-quarters respectively in 2001) it is equally clear that support has been significantly dented in recent years, particularly among the Protestant community. In 1996 the marked increase in preference for living and working in mixed-religion environments could be explained by the more congenial and sanguine atmosphere inspired by the 1994 ceasefires and the low level of violence in the inter-ceasefire period. However, an increase in other forms of sectarianism since the ceasefires, such as intimidation and harassment, may underpin current preferences for residential and workplace segregation.
CONCLUSION

The indicators reported here suggest a marked deterioration in community relations and a distinct retreat towards single-identity environments among both communities since 1996. Moreover the survey evidence also indicates that, since 1996, the Catholic and Protestant communities have developed notably different attitudes on a range of issues. In general, Catholics seem more amenable to efforts to promote cross-community contact as demonstrated by their greater willingness to integrate. The general optimism inherent in Catholic responses is, however, tempered by a growing sense of distrust and unease within the Protestant community. Protestants expressed less enthusiasm for inter-religious mixing, a pattern which becomes more pronounced after 1996. Taken together with evidence from the 1999 survey (Hughes et al, 2000), where Protestant respondents were less confident than Catholics that their rights and cultural traditions will be protected, it is reasonable to assume that Protestants are experiencing greater difficulty than Catholics with the changes at the macro-political and the meso-institutional levels. Hence, although the intention of the Good Friday Agreement is to create an inclusive society, the survey findings provide little evidence to suggest that this is the type of environment which is currently perceived by most Protestants.

The survey evidence, taken in conjunction with greater electoral polarisation underlines the inherent tensions and dilemmas of a pluralist model of government. At present the Protestant community’s dissatisfaction appears to be related to its interpretation of the pluralist arrangements for government. Protestants seem to observe a neo-pluralist rather than a pluralist agenda at work in the sense that the state is negotiating and according greater legitimacy and recognition to the Catholic community than the Protestant community (Marsh, 2000). In any pluralist society the loss of social cohesion and the alienation of particular sections of interests
becomes inevitable unless particular efforts are made to engender confidence that the state will protect the interests of all groups (Marsh, 2000). Many Protestants, it would seem, do not believe that their rights and culture have been accorded the same degree of legitimacy as the Catholic community. This argument was put rather starkly by the newly elected DUP MP for East Londonderry, Gregory Campbell:

The Unionist community have given concession after concession to nationalists and Republicans … now we’re in the queue now we’re going to the Prime Minister to say that we want equality and we want legitimacy for our cause. (Belfast Telegraph, 2001b).

The emphasis that has been placed on the pluralist model of developing community relations arguably represents a more realistic interpretation of the community relations problem. However, its success inevitably depends on the confidence of participating groups that the macro- and meso-environment will protect their interests.
REFERENCES


1 Statistics collected by the Royal Ulster Constabulary between 1985 and 1995 show that ‘loyalist’ parades have increased in number by 684 over the 10 year period <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/parade/jarman.htm>.

2 Aughey (2001) lists the concessions the British Government made to republicans in an effort to secure the latter would engage in ‘exclusively democratic’ processes. These included the continued early release of prisoners, the reduction of troop levels (despite continued paramilitary involvement in punishment beatings and intimidation), an agreement to meet a long-standing republican demand for an inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday, the acceptance of the central recommendations of the Patten Report on police reforms (which were lambasted by unionists), permission, against the advice of the Speaker, that Sinn Féin MPs should be allowed access the facilities of the House of Commons, without having taken an oath of allegiance, and, crucially,
the persuasion of David Trimble that he should recommend his party share power with Sinn Féin. This was based on an understanding that the IRA would co-operate with an Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and that there would be some gesture on arms to satisfy unionist sceptics. Neither happened, but devolved government went 'live' in November 1999 (Aughey, 2001, p. 217).
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