Background to the Research

• On Saturday 15th August, a terrorist bomb, inside a car, exploded at 3.10 p.m. within the heart of Omagh town centre.
• This report deals with the patients, injuries and flow of these patients from Omagh throughout Northern Ireland in the weeks that followed.
• The report also highlights the co-operation that existed between Northern Ireland HSS Trusts in the management of this, the worst atrocity in Northern Ireland in 30 years.
  

Research Approach

• Examination of original source medical records including RUC Casualty Bureau, individual hospital medical records and the Omagh Bomb Fund database.
• All source materials were correlated to provide an accurate record of the Northern Ireland response to the emergency.
  

Main Findings

• Twenty-nine people and two unborn babies were killed and large numbers were injured, many severely so.
• Two hundred and fifty-four patients were presented to the three nearest hospitals. All two hundred and fifty-four patients were assessed by midnight on the 15th of August.
• Patients treated in the primary receiving hospitals were admitted, transferred to other hospitals or treated and discharged. Transfers to other hospitals occurred via a combination of methods including helicopter and road ambulance.
• Many people suffered soft tissue blast injuries, hearing injury, amputations and burns. Multiple injuries were common.
• All the receiving Accident & Emergency Departments instituted a system of triage and initial resuscitation following the common ATLS principles.
• Twenty-one patients had injury severity scores of 16.
• Communication difficulties arose as a result of infrastructure damage to the telephone system by the bomb, and as a result of hospital switchboard overload.

Conclusions

• The pattern of co-operation between the various hospitals involved in the care of the victims, although not previously planned nor accounted for in individual hospital emergency plans, worked extremely well.
• Analysis of injuries and hospital transfer destination show that those making decisions about the appropriateness of units, working from a knowledge of available facilities in these units, were largely correct in their transfer decisions.
• Communication difficulties did not appear to have resulted in major morbidity.