Managing Disorder.  Responding to Interface Violence in North Belfast

Author(s): Neil Jarman
Document Type: Report
Year: 2000
Publisher: Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
Place of Publication: Belfast
Subject Area(s): N.I. Conflict, Sectarianism, Peace Process, Crime and Criminal Justice, Policing, Law and Order

Abbreviations: NI - Northern Ireland

Background to the Research

  • Between June and October 1996, North Belfast suffered extensive and widespread sectarian violence and disorder. Localised trouble occurred at a number of interfaces, with more sustained disruption in September.  This report explores some of the factors underpinning the emergence and persistence of sectarian interface violence and considers attempts to counter the problem.

Research Approach

  • The research was based at the Community Development Centre in North Belfast and included interviews and discussions with local community workers, members of the police, and other statutory agencies, and meetings and workshops with people from both major communities. The report begins with a review of recent instances of sectarian violence and public disorder in the area, followed by an overview of the characteristics of interface areas and communities and the reasons for the persistence of violence, a consideration of the role of young people, a review of some recent responses to the problem, and a discussion of the current state of police - community relations.

Main Findings

  • The Police in Antrim Road and North Queen Street composed statistics for those areas in North Belfast that erupted in violence most extensively in 1996. They reveal 1,444 recorded cases of criminal damage, 409 cases of assault, 316 cases of riot and 2,169 incidents in seven small interface areas across North Belfast from 1996-1999. 
  • Although there was a rise in the number of incidents through the spring leading to a peak in July and a steady decline after the end of the marching season, violence and public disorder continued throughout the year in each area. While some of the violence can be linked to flashpoint events, or less obvious triggers such as a Celtic-Rangers match, trouble frequently broke out with no more obvious a trigger than perhaps a very localised incident involving children or young people.
  • A number of factors have been identified as roots of the disorder: parades; policing; issues of territory; segregation; power; sectarianism; young people; the Agreement; and ambiguity to the violence.
  • A disturbing point highlighted is that barrier or peace-line construction has continued since the paramilitary ceasefires were declared in 1994.
  • The following have been shown to be factors of life in interface areas: higher than average levels of social and economic disadvantage; fewer industries, business or commercial premises; few social or welfare services or leisure resources; a narrower and less accessible range of resources; and restricted access to facilities and services. 
  • Studies have acknowledged the very real dangers of living in interface areas, highlighting experiences of verbal and physical violence, stone throwing, shooting, bombings, rioting, petrol bombing and vandalism.
  • The limited amount of published material, which gives voice to young people in working class areas, suggests that they experience a common core of problems: little or no money and few opportunities to obtain work; being too young for pubs and clubs, but feeling too old for organised youth activities; and few attractive local resources, yet travel out of the area is either expensive or potentially dangerous. 
  • A survey of nearly 300 young people (Woodvale Resource Centre) revealed interface areas as the most popular places to gather. 
  • Rioting is acknowledged as an attraction of interface areas, as it involves no financial cost and helps to relieve boredom, which can be particularly true during the long summer holidays. Young people have been found to be successful at both raising and maintaining tensions in an area. Community workers noted that adults may allow violence to continue before showing their power and authority by stopping it. 
  • People working in the community and voluntary sector have developed a number of strategies and projects in response to the trouble. Sometimes these have involved working in conjunction with the police. The report focuses on approaches taken in North Belfast and the work of the Community Development Centre.
  • Building barriers to separate communities has been a prominent and distinctive approach to conflict management. However, it has been argued this displaces the violence to a neighbouring or adjacent street.
  • A mobile phone network, to maintain lines of communication between neighbouring communities and with the police and other statutory bodies, has functioned and increased each summer since 1997 and is highly regarded by a diverse range of statutory agencies.
  • Changing police strategies are discussed, particularly the phone network. While members of the network are generally happy to receive information from the police, some resent pressure to respond to what they see as the police agenda. The often ambivalent attitude to working with the police, even in such a limited manner, is reciprocated by the attitudes of many junior officers in the North Belfast area to working with certain sections of the community.
  • Findings are presented from discussions with Constables and Sergeants based at a North Belfast police station. Police officers generally believed that most people within the local community were happy with the level of service received from the police. Officers believed that antagonism towards the police was limited to a small minority of people. However, it was accepted that there were a number of people who would resent the police whatever happened and that there were some local areas where the police were not welcome and would not be welcomed in the near future.
  • There was a widespread belief that the public was ignorant of much police work, especially of the level of police resources and the limits to available manpower and vehicles. It was recognised that there was a need for a better understanding of the local community.
  • Most officers felt that they had no real contact with the local community except when responding to calls or dealing with public disorder. Nor did they have any contact with, or knowledge of, the organised community sector, nor with the range and extent of existing police-community relationships. It was agreed that a greater opportunity to patrol on foot would considerably help improve knowledge of and relationships with the community. However, given that foot patrols are expensive on resources, they found it difficult to understand how Patten’s proposals for a reduction in officers and an increase in links and contacts with the community could realistically be achieved.
  • Officers differentiated three areas in which the police engaged with the community: Neighbourhood Units; Community Police Liaison Committees; and with general community activists or representatives.
  • A number of officers felt that a more thoughtful strategy than the traditional practice of ‘throwing men at any crisis’ was needed. It was felt that the work of most, if not all, Neighbourhood Officers needed to be ring-fenced.
  • Many officers had an underlying sense of uncertainty about what will happen to police work over the next few years. Many sections of the public would probably have unrealistic expectations about the impact the proposed changes and many officers felt that implementing the Patten recommendations would lead to an apparently lower quality of police service and a more difficult working environment. There was also a general feeling that the police were increasingly having to deal with a range of social problems rather than simply responding to criminal acts and the police could not be expected to respond to such problems alone but somehow needed to work more in partnership with other agencies and with the community sector.
  • The report concludes by placing the sectarian violence and disorder in a wider context of other forms of violent behaviour. Paramilitary incidents and violence figures have risen quite substantially from a low point in 1995/96. Punishment shootings increased and punishment beatings increased considerably on the pre-ceasefire period.
  • There were disputes at 41 parades in 12 locations in 1995; 52 disputes in 22 locations in 1996 and 59 disputes at 21 locations in 1997. The Parades Commission imposed conditions on 81 parades (plus a further 38 related to Drumcree) in 1998-99 and on 100 parades (plus another 52 related to Drumcree) in 1999-2000.
  • RUC data reveal that attacks on certain types of property clearly identified with one section of the community have continued to occur on a regular basis over recent years, with much of this violence concentrated in the summer marching season.
  • Another result of the continuing fluctuations in sectarian tensions has been an increase in residential segregation of working class areas.
  • The rise in the annual numbers of domestic incidents and violence is dramatic and has more than doubled following the ceasefires. Similarly the number of racist incidents has risen significantly in each of the past five years. Perhaps the most significant finding is the high proportion of those recorded racist incidents that have occurred in North Belfast.
  • As part of a larger study of paramilitary punishment beatings, Colin Knox and Rachel Monaghan noted that levels of some forms of crime, such as violent crimes and crimes against the person, as well as the overall crime levels, have begun to rise significantly.
  • A number of areas of violent, criminal and anti-social behaviour are becoming increasingly prominent, if only in an anecdotal manner. These include a growing concern about the scale of use and availability of illegal drugs, a perceived rise in the scale of organised crime and persistent ongoing problems with anti-social behaviour.

 


 

Home | About ORB | Contact


Disclaimer: © ORB 2001Thursday, 28-Aug-2008 15:39