Generation, Prejudice and Politics in Northern Ireland

Author(s): Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister
Document Type: Chapter
Year: 1999
Title of Publication: Ireland North and South: Perspectives from Social Science
Publisher: Oxford University Press for The British Academy
Place of Publication: Oxford
ISBN: 0-19-726195-7
Pages: 457-491
Subject Area(s): N.I. Conflict
Client Group(s) : Men, Women, Young People

Abbreviations: DUP - Democratic Unionist Party, OUP - Official Unionist Party, SDLP - Social Democratic Labour Party

Background to the Research

  • It has been mooted that generational change offers an answer to the 'Troubles' as younger, more tolerant, people take the place of older, more prejudiced, generations. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the younger generation, having more experience of political violence, are less tolerant than older generations.

Research Approach

  • The authors explore the degree of tolerance or prejudice across the generations in the North, and track the consequences of those views for political outlooks. These issues are explored through the creation of a merged file of data from the five Northern Ireland Social Attitudes surveys carried out between 1989 and 1995. This produced a total sample size of 5,643. The authors then identified nine generations within the sample, spanning from 1930 to 1995, and the variable of religion was used to explore religious tolerance/prejudice amongst these nine generations.

Main Findings

  • The data suggest that there are strong generational effects for religious prejudice. Those in the post-1968 generations display the highest level of prejudice.
  • Amongst Protestants, prejudice remains stable or increases with each succeeding generation, the exception being those who experienced the abolition of the Stormont parliament and the beginning of the 'Troubles'. Prejudice is higher within this generation than the levels found among those who grew up in the early years of the century, and experienced the violence that accompanied the setting up of the state.
  • Of the three generations with the highest levels of prejudice, two are post-1968 generations and the other is the civil rights generation.
  • Amongst Catholics, there is considerable prejudice among those who grew up in the immediate post-war period and those with the lowest levels of prejudice grew up during the First World War and during the Depression of the 1930s. Religious prejudice grew steadily from the 1930s onward, and then declined among those who grew up in the 1960s.
  • Similar to Protestants, the most prejudiced generation amongst Catholics is the current one - specifically those for whom the Hunger Strikes were the defining political event.
  • Overall, the results show that the post-1968 'Troubles' have made people more prejudiced; this is most noticable among Protestants.

Generations and Political Identity

  • Across the combined data, 99.2% of those who identified with unionism were Protestant. Of those who identified with nationalism, 98.9% were Catholic.
  • However, the combined data also showed that 39% of respondents (49% Protestant and 51% Catholic) reported that they identified with neither unionism nor nationalism - this is just short of the figure of 43% who identified themselves as unionist and twice the nationalist proportion - 18%.
  • The proportion of disaffected Protestants has grown steadily over the years, half or more of those rejecting a unionist identity are in the two most recent generations.
  • Upwards of 4 in every 10 Catholics reject a nationalist identity. This proportion rose steadily with each generation until the civil rights generation, after which the proportion has remained fairly constant, with an increase among those whose first political experience was the Hunger Strikes in the early 1980s.
  • Among Protestants, strong unionist identifiers are more likely to support the OUP or the DUP and those who reject unionism either claim no political affiliation or support the Alliance Party.
  • Among Catholics, strong nationalist identifiers are more likely to support Sinn Fein, less strong nationalist identifiers with the SDLP, and rejecters of nationalism, the Alliance Party.
  • Prejudice has increased among the younger generations, yet more voters are disaffected among the younger generations, and among those who cleave to a traditional political identity, the strength of that identity is likely to be weaker.
  • Among those who retain traditional political identities, prejudice has become a much more important factor in political views. In fact, among the younger generations that have grown up since the 'Troubles' began, religious prejudice is more likely to shape their political outlooks compared to those who grew up before the 'Troubles'.
  • Among the generation of Protestants that experienced the Irish Republican Army resurgence in the 1950s, the impact of prejudice on political identity is at an historic low, it rises in each succeeding generation - with a slight decline within the Anglo-Irish Agreement generation.
  • The impact of prejudice on political identity is broadly similar for Catholics and Protestants. However, the impact of prejudice on political identity is lower for those who grew up in the Second World War and the most recent generation is the most polarised so far. The generation who experienced the First World War, the Home Rule Movement and partition, are the second most polarised in the way they link prejudice and political identity.

Conclusions

  • The post-1968 'Troubles' have had a disproportionate impact on the generations growing up during the past quarter of a century. These generations represent about one-third of the total population.
  • Those born in the years after 1968 are significantly more likely to demonstrate high levels of religious prejudice, and these levels of prejudice are more likely to form the basis for political action than they do among the older generations.
  • If the violence were to continue at its present level, or to escalate, the numbers who will be affected by it will increase as a proportion of the total population. This will, in turn, increase the levels of prejudice across society and via political identity, bring about more support for extreme parties and groups.
  • If the 'Troubles' end there will still be, within the population, a large minority marked by political violence and it will take several decades before levels of prejudice fall through generational replacement.
  • The connections between social processes and political outlooks reinforce the impact of violence on each emerging generation. It is perhaps in this area that researchers should look to find possible solutions.
 

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