Background to the Research

• Since the mid-ninetieth century, until nearly the end of the twentieth century, Ireland has been unique among the populations of Europe. This chapter seeks to explain the contrast between Ireland and the rest of the industrial world and to explore contrasts in the population profile and migration within and between the North of Ireland and the South of Ireland.
  

Research Approach

• The author explores these issues through the use of official statistics and surveys from both the North and the South of Ireland.
  

Main Findings

• As late as 1970 the Irish fertility rate, as measured by the TFR, was the highest of any Western developed country; in 1970 the TFR was 3.87 in the Irish Republic and 3.25 in NI. That year, the mean TFR of 18 West European countries was 2.41.
• As a result of high fertility, the Irish population is the most youthful in the industrialised world with 24% of the population under the age of 15 in 1996 and only 11% aged 65 and over (24% and 13% in NI in 1993).
• Emigration is the greatest feature of Ireland's demography. During the 1880s emigration, primarily to North America, exceeded natural increase by two or threefold. Emigration to the UK in the 1950s saw emigration at nearly the same rate.
• In general, since the 1880s, emigration has been declining (except during the 1950s), falling to a net annual loss of 20,000 people after the Second World War. Up to 1990, around 60% of post-war emigrants went to the UK and most were unskilled. In the 1990s more have gone to the US and to the EU and these emigrants tend to be better educated and more mobile than their predecessors.
• The 'first demographic transition' - whereby life expectancy for both sexes rises to over 70 years and average family size falls to about 2 children, which took place in most industrial countries over the course of the last century, has only recently reached Ireland.
• The 'second demographic transition' - consisting of new patterns of sexual behaviour, contraception, abortion, co-habitation and illegitimacy has begun in the North and South and is occurring alongside the first demographic transition.
• In both the North and South of Ireland, illegitimate births (25 per 1,000 live births in 1960) have increased sharply since the 1970s to a combined figure for the whole of Ireland of 250 per 1,000 live births in 1995.
• Co-habitation occurred in 3.9% of families (40% with children) in the South according to the 1996 Census. The equivalent figure for the North according to the 1991 Census was 2.4%.
• Until the Family Law (Divorce) 1996 Act became law in 1997, divorce was illegal in the South. In 1986 there were 37,245 separated persons in the South of Ireland - by 1996 this had doubled to 87,800. In the North, divorce increased from 1,653 in 1983 to 2,200 in 1995.
• The provisions of the 1967 Abortion Act do not apply in the North: the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945 permits abortion under strict criteria. Approximately 1,800 women per year from NI obtain abortions in England and Wales. The abortion rate for women from the North is estimated to have been 59.2 per 1,000 live births in 1995 and 93.4 per 1,000 live births for women from the South. Abortion, despite referendum, remains illegal in the South.
• Since partition, two different profiles have emerged which reflect the political and religious divide. The TFR in the North in 1961 was 3.39, 3.13 in 1971, and 2.64 in 1978. Overall, the TFR in the North has been lower than that of the South: most notably during the greatest period of violence between 1969 and 1980. However, there has recently been a rapid fertility decline in the Republic.
• In the North, data on comparative fertility rates between Catholics and non-Catholics is contentious and incomplete. In 1961, Catholic TFR in the North was 4.6 compared to the Protestant 3.0, and in 1971 the comparison was 4.1 to 2.8. Regardless of the measure, Catholic fertility in the 1970s was 40-50% higher than Protestant fertility.
• Overall there has been a gradual decline in completed family size in both communities from the 1920 figures of 5.29 and 3.56 births per woman respectively to 1963 figures of 4.09 and 2.80. Statements of intended fertility suggest 2.93 in 1982/3 Catholic marriages compared to 2.49 in Protestant marriages.
• The effects of emigration on the size of both communities is difficult to assess. Up until the 1961 census, it was estimated that 60% of emigrants were Catholic, this is thought to have diminished to 50% between 1971 and 1991, thus offsetting the Catholic fertility 'advantage'.
• There has been no formal restriction on the use of contraception in the North; contraception was banned in the South in the 1920s, becoming legal in a Supreme Court ruling in 1973 and enshrined in legislation in 1979.
• The limited data available suggests that family planning practice in the South is converging with the rest of the industrial world. The 1983 NIFS showed that 74.1% of Catholics approved of family planning, as did the majority of non-Catholics.
• In the latter quarter of the 19th century, life expectancy in Ireland was high by European standards - reflecting the predominantly rural population. This advantage was lost in the 20th century, as mortality rates began to converge after the Second World War.
• The NI mortality rates remain higher than those in England and Wales. In 1992 life expectancy for women in the South of Ireland (and England and Wales) was 79 years and 78.3 years in NI. In the last two decades of the 20th century, both regions shared the same improved trend.
• NI has the highest rate of heart disease in the world and the South follows closely behind. Death rates from stroke and respiratory failure in both regions are very high. Perinnatal death is relatively low in both regions, however neural tube defects are high in Ireland.
• In the early 20th century, Ireland was unusual in European terms because women lived no longer than men. This can be attributed to the disadvantage of women in a mainly rural society and the high incidence of TB to which young women and people of Irish origin appear to be more vulnerable. Female excess deaths disappeared more quickly in the urbanised North. Although the rise in female life expectancy since the 1960s in the North may be partly due to the excess male mortality rate from illnesses such as heart disease.
• The birth rate in Ireland began to sharply decline around 1980, this can be linked to women's participation in the workforce. In 1971, 7.5% of married women in Ireland were in the workforce compared to 40% in most Western Countries. This increased to 21.3% by 1988 and to 40.7% by 1995.
• The high fertility rate in Ireland is often explained purely in terms of the dominance of Catholic ideology in Ireland. However, Spain and Italy have the lowest birth-rates in the world. The idea of 'Catholic fertility' doesn't work well as an explanation. The 'minority status effect' of the high rate of fertility in Catholics in NI is felt to be exceptional among Catholic populations.
• Other factors in the persistence of high fertility in Ireland include the role of emigration. Emigration has allowed high levels of fertility to exist alongside declining population size. Long-term high emigration inhibits the modernisation of fertility.

Conclusions

• The southern Catholic countries have lower rates cohabitation and illegitimacy than others. Ireland has a high illegitimacy rate and is behaving more like its north-west European neighbours (of which France and Belgium are predominantly Catholic) than its Southern coreligionists.
• The author predicts that fertility in Ireland will stabilise at a level more typical of north-western Europe than southern Europe.